Materialism - Ryle’s Philosophical Behaviourism

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Materialism: Ryle’s Philosophical Behaviourism

Materialism is the belief that there is one substance which is matter and everything else is reducible to it, including the mind.

Modern materialism

Modern materialism was partly made possible by the effect of Cartesian (Descartes) dualism on western thought.
- If matter is just extension and mind is non-spatial, then it is simple to bracket off the mind and focus purely on the physical substance.

Ryle’s Philosophical Behaviourism

Gilbert Ryle calls Descartes’ theory ‘the ghost in the machine’ (ghost=mind, machine=body).
According to Ryle, there is no mind which exists as a separate entity to the body and to search for one is to make a category mistake.
By this, he means that the brain and mind belong to different logical categories but have mistakenly been associated together.

Ryle's Cambridge/Oxford analogy

One analogy for this is the foreigner who, visiting Cambridge or Oxford University for the first time, is shown all the different colleges and buildings but then asks ‘where is the University?’
The mistake is that he is looking for something separate from all the buildings he has been shown without realising that he has already seen the university.
In just the same way, Ryle argues that dualists are mistakenly searching for something over and above the brain, or behaviour, called the mind.

'Mental' events = specific pattern

Ryle was a philosophical behaviourist who saw ‘mental’ events as just referring to a specific pattern of behaviour. ‘Mind’ is no longer internal; it is what we do with our bodies.
- Eg. when someone is depressed or angry or joyful, we look at the pattern of behaviour they exhibit in each different case. We cannot see beyond this behaviour
So mental terminology actually means something physical (eg. behaviour).

Limitations of Ryle's Philosophical Behaviourism

Ryle was a philosophical behaviourist – who saw ‘mental’ events as just referring to a specific pattern of behaviour - ‘mind’ is no longer internal; it is what we do with our bodies.

Counter-intuitive to humans

This approach is counter-intuitive to humans as subjects who have what they perceive as internal states of mind.
- Some of these internal states may not manifest as outward patterns of behaviour at all – so do they not exist?

Ryle's explanation for wishing

Ryle partly anticipates problematic states such as wishing, which seems to have no particular pattern of behaviour attached to it, by talking about ‘dispositions to behave’.
Appropriate behaviour is regarded as potential and can be anticipated given certain circumstances. So a person wishing to go on holiday may spend a lot of time on travel websites, for instance.

Ward's criticism of Ryle

Ward feels Ryle’s account is inadequate.
- Firstly, what about pretending? Someone who pretends to be angry and someone who is angry may exhibit the exact same behaviour, but one of them is not experiencing the same internal state.

Ward's criticism of Ryle

Secondly, we do know our experience from the inside. When we feel pain, for instance, we know that such a feeling cannot be completely captured by a description of the way we behave when we feel it.
Thirdly, what about self-awareness? It is impossible to say how being aware of yourself as a thinking being is capable of being described in terms of behaviour or a ‘disposition to behave’ in a certain way.